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ii. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred u$on this court 
pursuant to Rule 3(a) Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals this being an appeal from a final Order of 
the Fifth Circuit Court, Salt Lake Cii^ y Department, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Plaintiff/Appelant, a Utah ^eal estate 
company, filed this action to recover a real estate 
commission from defendants/respondentd based upon a 
listing agreement entered into by the parties on 
May 19, 1986. Plaintiff/Appellant will be referred 
to hereinafter as either Realty World or as Agent and 
defendants/respondents hereinafter as Marsdens or 
Sellers. 
Marsdens answered and filed |a Third-Party 
Complaint against Realty World's Agent Thomas E. 
Eveleth. Marsdens alleged the listingl agreement 
was not the final agreement between the parties and 
that Realty World and Eveleth had committed fraud in 
inducing Marsdens to execute the listing agreement. 
Said listing agreement is attached in the Addendum 
to this Brief as Exhibit "Aff and is alfeo found as 
Exhibit "A" to plaintiff!s complaint. 
On June 12, 1987 the Circuit Court held a 
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Hearing to decide if parol evidence would be allowed 
at the jury trial June 18, 1987. The court after 
reviewing the memorandum of the parties and hearing 
the arguments of counsel issued the Order allowing 
Parol Evidence to be used at trial. A copy of said 
Order being found in the Addendum as Exhibit "B". 
Following the closing of the evidence on June 15, 
1987, pursuant to Motions by Plaintiff and defendants 
for directed verdicts the court dismissed plaintiff's 
claims against defendants for fraud and punitive 
damages and defendant's claims against third-party 
defendant for fraud and punitive damages. 
The Jury returned with a verdict of no cause 
of action as to plaintiff's complaint and awarded 
defendants their attorney's fees. The Jury found 
there was mutual mistake between the parties and 
that no agreement had been formed. Plaintiff filed 
a Motion for a New Trial or to Amend the Judgment 
alleging that the jury erred in finding that there 
was no agreement between the parties and then 
awarding attorney's fees based upon that agreement, 
that one of the jurors lived in the same housing 
complex as the Marsdens and Eveleth and that one 
of the defendants' witnesses had offered false 
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testimony. The court struck from the Judament the 
jury's award of attorney's fees to defendants, denied 
the other portions of plaintiff's Motion and awarded 
defendants their costs of $247,05. Plaintiff 
appeals from the lower court's allowance of the 
introduction of parol evidence and its denial of 
Plaintifffs Motion for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
(1) Did the trial court err in allowing 
parol evidence to be heard, (2) Were the proceed 
ings tainted by a juror hearing the case who lived 
in the same condominium complex as defendants and 
third-party defendant and by false testimony from 
one of defendants1 witnesses. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Section 25-5-1 and 25-5-4 U.C.A. See Addendum. 
Rule 9(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: In all 
averements of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge and other 
condition of a person may be averred generally, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff sought in its action filed in 
the Circuit Court to recover a real estate commission 
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from defendants based upon the home that defendants 
had listed with plaintiff being sold. The parties 
entered into a listing agreement on May 19, 1986 
(Exhibit "A" Addendum). The agreement exempted 
four names from the transaction* Marius Nelson, 
Gene Brown, Robert Harper and Lamont Robinson. The 
term of the agreement was from May 19, 1986 through 
July 19, 1986. 
On June 16, 1986, Marsdens received 
$1,000.00 from Paul Stevens and entered into a 
written option to purchase agreement. After siqn-
ing the agreement with Stevens, James Marsden 
prepared a letter asking plaintiff to remove its 
listing of the property (Exhibit "B" to plaintiff's 
complaint). On or about June 28, 1986, Marsdens 
entered into a new listing agreement with Realty 
World (Exhibit "C" to plaintiff's complaint). In 
this document Marsdens exempted Paul Stevens as an 
individual they would not have to paty a commission 
on if the home was leased or sold to said person. 
On June 29, 1986, Marsdens prepared a letter to 
Realty World indicating that the home had been sold 
to Mr. Stevens (Exhibit "D" to plaintiff's complaint). 
On July 15, 1986 Mr. Stevens qave Marsdens an 
additional $40,000.00 and on August 25, 1986 Stevens 
and Marsdens closed the sale and purchase of the 
Realty World's 
real estate. 
Plaintiff discovered the Ma^sden-Stevens 
transaction had occurred and filed action to re-
cover its commission based upon the listing agreement 
entered into on May 19, 1986 (Exhibit "A" in addendum) 
alleging that during the term of the Agreement a buyer 
had been found namely Paul Stevens. defendants alleged 
that they had a verbal agreement with 
agent Thomas E. Eveleth that if they ^old the home 
themselves that no commission would result. Defendants 
alleged that by now seeking a commission Eveleth was 
attempting a fraud upon Marsdens. Re4lty World alleged 
that Marsden by keeping the information from Realty World 
that $1,000.00 had been delivered to Marsdens by Stevens 
was liable to plaintiff for damages irj fraud as well 
as plaintiff's commission. 
On June 12, 1987, three days prior to the 
jury trial the parties argued before the Honorable 
Phillip K. Palmer, Circuit Court Judge the issue of 
whether or not defendants should be allowed to introduce 
parol evidence to vary the terms of the written listing 
agreement at time of trial. Counsel submitted briefs 
with no supporting affidavits and argued the matter 
before the court. The court issued itls Order allowing 
the admission of parol evidence (Exhibit "B" in addendum), 
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At the time for seating of the jury one female juror 
stated that she lived in the same complex as the 
Marsdens and Eveleth and was excused by Judge Palmer. 
Evidence was presented and followincr both parties 
resting the court upon motion dismissed plaintiff!s 
claims for fraud and punitive damages against defendants 
and defendants1 claims for fraud against third-party 
defendant Eveleth. The Jury found that there was 
mutual mistake between the parties that the agreement 
between them was void found no cause of action for 
plaintiff and awarded defendants their attorney's fees. 
Subsequent to trial it was ascertained that 
juror Lee Verl Conder lived in the same condominium 
complex as Marsdens and Eveleth. Plaintiff filed a 
Motion for a New Trial based upon the jury's improper 
award of attorney's fees and irregularity in the pro-
ceedings due to the jury problem and false testimony 
by defendants' witness Rita Luke. The trial judqe 
deleted from the jury's verdict the award of attorney's 
fees to defendants and denied the other portions of 
plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial or to Amend Judgment 
(Order dated July 16, 1987). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Our Supreme Court ruled on a similar listinq 
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agreement to the one in this case and find it to be 
clear and unambiguous and did not allow parol evidence 
to be introduced. There was error in law in allowing 
such evidence to be introduced to the jury. 
The mere naked allegation of fraud cannot 
be used as was done in this case to defeat the purpose 
of the parol evidence to-wit to maintain the sanctity 
of the written agreement. 
Where a large potential pool of jurors exists 
there was prejudice and irregularity in the proceedings 
where one of the jurors lived in the $ame condominium 
complex as the defendants and third-p^rty defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IVf ALLOWING PAROL 
EVIDENCE 
In E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency Inc. v. 
Broderick (522 P. 2nd 144, Utah 1974) d>ur Supreme Court 
was asked to analyze a contract almosii identical in 
language to the one before this court J The question 
presented to the court was whether a dlear and unambiguous 
term of a written contract can be varijed by parol evidence, 
The person in the shoes of the Marsdens in that case, 
Broderick, claimed that there was a verbal aqreement 
that a commission of 6% would result only if the real 
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estate company sold the subject home. This is similar 
to the position being taken by Marsdens in this case. 
The court analyzed the contract and found 
it to be clear, definite and unambiguous and that 
parol evidence may not be taken to vary the terms of 
such a document and reversed the trial court that had 
allowed the parol evidence admitted. 
The court reasoned that without holding to 
this rule there would be no assurance of the enforce-
ability of a written contract and a party would be 
left to the mercy of uncertainties o^ oral testimony. 
The same contract language that plaintiff uses to 
justify an award of a commission is the same language 
that our Supreme Court found to be clear and unambiguous. 
Marsdens attempt to point to a line on the listing 
agreement that says 3 names reserved and say that that 
line is unclear and thus parol evidence is necessary. 
Again in the Strout case (cited above) the court faced 
that issue wherein the Sellers claimed that some blanks 
had been left out. The court pointed out that there 
was no question as to the portion of the contract 
dealing with commissions and that such should not be 
a door-opening device to allow parol evidence in. 
Our legislature in the area of real estate 
has recognized the great dangers of mixing in alleged 
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verbal agreements and has required relal estate brokers 
to put their agreements into writing if they expect 
to be paid for their work (see Sections 25-5-1 and 
25-5-4 U.C.A. in addendum). Every real estate trans-
action will have discussion before documents are signed. 
However to force a court to go through lengthy testimony 
on conversations before a clear agreement is signed 
would be both time consuming, against public policy 
and turn most cases involving real estate contracts 
into swearing matches. 
Here where the form was a ohe-page agreement 
executed in form not once but twice by Marsdens, in 
the area of real estate, a great respect should be given 
to the sanctity of the written agreement. In this case 
the jury by hearing parol evidence received the opposite 
impression that being that it was more important what 
was said before a contract was signed than the contract 
itself. The introduction of such testimony was highly 
prejudicial to plaintiff and created the impression that 
although documents were signed they hqive little if any 
legal effect. 
Marsdens have attempted to det around the 
Strout case by citing the Union Bank y. Swenson case, 
707 P.2nd. 663 (Utah 1985) as holding 
is fraud, contemporaneous conversations and statements 
that where there 
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regarding the contract must be introduced. In Union 
Bank the defendants signed promissory notes in an 
individual capacity. When default occurred and the 
bank sued, Swensons in affidavits alleged that the 
bank had told them that the individual signatures 
were for appearances only and would not be used for 
collection purposes. The trial court applied the 
parol evidence rule and granted Summary Judgment for 
the Bank. 
The court stated that there is a rebuttable 
presumption that a writing which on its face appears 
to be an integrated agreement is what it appears to be. 
However in this case the court found that there was 
enough of a question of a material fact revolvinq around 
the fraud issue that summary judgment was not proper. 
The court said parol evidence rule does have an excep-
tion where fraud is involved* 
The question to be asked however, is there 
any parol evidence rule left where a party can simply 
allege fraud, have the jury hear all its parol evidence 
and then have the court discover that there really was 
no fraud. By that time all the damage has been done 
and it is impossible for a jury to forget what it 
has heard. 
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A review of the pleadings oh file reveal 
that is what happened in this case. Marsdens' Answer 
and Third-Party complaint use the words fraud. However, 
there is not one date or circumstance cited to meet 
the requirement of Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure that circumstances constituting fraud shall 
be stated with particularity (see also Heathman v Hatch, 
372 P.2nd 990 (Utah 1962) that mere u^e of the term 
fraud does not meet the requirements of this rule). 
Nor was any affidavit submitted by the Marsdens submitted 
to the court before the June 12, 1986 parol evidence 
hearing to give the court any circumstances surrounding 
jury to hear parol 
[Legation in defend-
Defendants rested 
meaningless if as 
fraud. The lower court allowed the jj 
evidence based simply upon a naked alf 
ants1 pleadings that there was fraud. 
upon the allegations in their pleadinfcrs and unlike the 
Swenson case there was no sworn statement that would give 
the court some reason to allow parol Evidence in. The 
parol evidence rule would be rendered 
in this case any allegation of fraud pould be made and 
the door opened to parol evidence. This case was a 
classic example of the harm that can occur. After the 
evidence was presented the trial judge determined as a 
matter of law that there had been no fraud. However, 
the damage had been done as far as th^ jury was concerned. 
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The court in Union Bank was surely saying that a court 
before allowing parol evidence it must make more of 
an inquiry than simply saying you have plead fraud, we 
will not let the jury hear parol evidence. 
It is also to be noted that the Union Bank 
case cites language from the Strout case that parol 
evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict clear and 
unambiguous terms of an integrated contract. In Union 
Bank the court states that "Fraud" must be fleshed out 
by elaboration and consideration. This was not done in 
this case before the jury was allowed to hear that 
evidence. 
II. IRREGULARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS (JURY) 
At the time the jury was selected juror Sue 
Morris was excused for cause it being made known to the 
court that she lived in the same complex as the defend-
ants and third-party defendant. Despite this situation 
occuring, juror Lee Verl Conder kept quiet that he also 
lived in the same complex as the defendants and third-
party defendant and was seated as one of the four jurors. 
Although counsel cannot go into the mind of that juror 
it would appear to be an irregularity in the proceedings 
where the court excuses one juror for cause and through 
the silence of another juror that man is seated on the 
panel. In a large city with a large jury pool, plaintiff 
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deserves to have a jury seated that is free of such 
a situation. The failure of this juror to speak up 
was unnecessary and goes to his state| of mind to hear 
the case. Plaintiff would have used |a challenge if 
such a fact had been disclosed to him|. (See Jenkins 
v. Parrish 627 P.2nd 533 (Utah 1981) that this is 
prejudical error). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff/Appellant seeks a| new trial wherein 
parol evidence that would vary the cljear terms of a 
contract is not admitted and is not used to confuse a 
jury into thinking that instead of th[e written agreement 
being most vital, pre-contract negotiations play the 
largest role. Plaintiff/Appellant farther seeks a new 
trial on the grounds that defendants/respondents were 
allowed simply to state the word fraud in their pleadings, 
not state it with particularity, file no supporting 
affidavits and have the judge allow them to offer parol 
evidence based upon their naked allegations of fraud. 
Plaintiff also seeks a new trial where all jurors have 
fairly disclosed their situation to the trial judge. 
Respectfully submitted thi^ 4th day of December, 
1987. 
JAMES H. DEANS 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing together with Addendum 
to Paul M. Belnap, attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
at Sixth Floor Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this 4th day of December, 1987. 
ii 
JAMES H. DEANS 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
-14-
ADDENDUM 
FORM A SALES AGENCY CONTRACT 
(Exciusive|RightToSe!I) 
Member of Multiple Listing S 
1. In consideration of your agreement to 
reasonable efforts to find a purchaser or tenant 
herein, from date hereof, the exclusive right tp 
thereof, at the price and terms stated herein, or 
writing. 
2. During the iife o* this contract. i f you f-nl 
or exchange saic property c any par: t re 'ec : 
whicn i may agree ir writing, or i' saic pr-{ 
during said term by mvself or any other party 
£ "m nr L^ q-x of sucn saie. lease1 
erviise of Salt Lane Board of REALTORS® 
list the property described on form E and to use 
therefor, I hereby grant you for the period stated 
sell, lease or exchange said property or any Dart 
at such other price or terms to which I may agree in 
tb i 
wise agreed in writing, shall be due and payab 
Should said property be sold, leased or exchan 
any party to whom the property was offered or 
term of this listing, I agree to pay you the com 
commission on such sale, lease or exchange 
contract entered into after the expiration date of 
3. You are hereby authorized to accept a 
the property as described on the property descr|pt 
to be held in a trust account. 
4. I hereby warrant the information contaf 
form (form B) to be correct and that I have mar 
lease or exchange said property, except as 
conveyance or lease and to prorate genera! ta| 
affecting said property to agreed date of posse: 
abstract to aate or at my option a policy of title i 
the name of the purchaser. In the event of sale o 
proper conveyance and acceptable evidence of 
5. In case of the employment of an attorney 
agree to pay a reasonable attorney's fee and all 
6. You are hereby authorized to obtain fina| 
holding a lien or interest on this property. 
7. You are hereby authorized and instructed 
Service of the Salt Lake Board of REALTORS® 
8. You are hereby authorized to place an 
9. This Sales Agency Contract may not be 
consent executed by the Principal Broker and 
shall be changed by written reauest received 
: £ cany wno is ready, able and willing to zjy. ;=ase 
se'd pnee and terms, or any cthe r price c- '~rr~.i. -c 
> or any part thereof is sold, leased or er.zr.zr.zez 
gree to pay tne broker listed below a commission of 
or exchange price which commission umess otner-
£ on the cate of closing the sale, lease or exchance. 
ged wi th in. 
shown by me. or you. or any other party during the 
mission above stated if I am not ooligatec to pay a 
another broker pursuant to another saies agency 
this contract. 
deposit as earnest money from any potential buyer on 
ion and informational form (form B). Said deposit 
•as 
ithfe 
1 from 
. months after such expiration to 
ned on the property description and informational 
rjetabie title or an otherwise establishea ngnt to sell. 
a. I agree to execute the necessary .documents of 
xes, insurance, rents, interest and other expenses 
ion and to furnish a good and marketable title witn 
hsurance in the amount of the purchase price ana in 
r lease of other than real property. I agree to provide 
title or right to sell, lease or exchange. 
to enforce any of the terms of this agreement. I 
ckosts of collection, 
ncial information from any mortgagee or other party 
to offer this property through the Multiple Listing 
appropriate sign on said property, 
phanged, modified or altered except by prior written 
owner(s) shown below, except that the listed price 
the owner(s). 
The parties hereto agree not to discriminate ag 
religion, sex or national origin in connection 
this agreement. ^ fi/gcPKi-S / < L < 
ainst any person or persons based on race, color. 
the sale, lease or exchange of properties under w th 
LISTED PROPERTY 
^>* L'T~ L « K 
/ £ 2 ^ /z, fr kr^^p &x 
(City) 
LISTED PRICE. 
is r " A /•+ 
(State) 
/ b~ "7 S~& & 
This contract is entered into this / / day of 
This contract expires on thp / f day of 
J& A H 
<\t\s'> 
. , IP *j~ 
^ ^ ^ Listing Company v T A " / OwnerTSlOnature) / 
BY\ ^ ^ 
Pnrj&pal bvx&r (Instn Name) 
/ " " 7 " / " * / r^ pnat  / ,-
Autnor«ifi£j^ rgeynT(S'Ignaiure;i 
I hereby acknowledge receipt of completed 
description and information form (Form 3). 
Complete CO'.n Form A'ard Form E. 
1 espy to o*ne' — 1 fopv.ro listing effir. 
Owner (Signature) 
;opies of this document (Form A) and the property 
S.L.c r. ^v.sec 9 ' 8-
V.!//sl-?.*K,,-
EXHIBIT "A" 
Paul M. Belnap, 0279 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
REALTY WORLD STONEBROOK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES L. MARSDEN and 
DONNA R. MARSDEN, 
Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THOMAS E. EVELETH, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'S MOTION 
TO ADMIT PAROLE EVIDENCE 
Cpivil No. 873000185-CV 
The above entitled matter came before the court on the defendants' 
motion to admit parole evidence on the 12th day of June, 1987 at the 
hour of 8:30 a.m. before the Honorable Phillip IC. Palmer with counsel 
for the plaintiff appearing and counsel for the defendants appearing. 
The Court having reviewed the memorandum, depositions and exhibits sub-
mitted by counsel, and having heard the arguments of counsel, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, t|iat the defendant's 
motion to admit parole evidence is granted, and the court specifically 
finds that the contracts in question and whibh are relied upon by 
the plaintiff are ambiguous and not integrat[( ed agreements. 
Fvliihif "R» 
DATED this day of July, 1987. 
BY THE COlJRT 
By _ _ _ ^ 
Circuit Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICAT f 
I hereby certify that I mailed a tr^ ie and correct copy 
of the foregoing to the following, postajge prepaid on this 
)3r day of July, 1987. 
Mr. James K. Deans 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
175 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
By 
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